

# 1989: CHANGES IN EAST EUROPEAN MODES OF GLOBAL INTEGRATION

A conference organised by the **Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet**Supported by the **Rosa Luxemburg Foundation** 

### FINAL PROGRAMME









#### **VENUE**

Gólya Community Centre and Cooperative Bar 1083 Budapest, Bókay János u. 34.



### 1989: Changes East European Modes of Global Integration

More than 25 years have passed since Eastern Europe formally reintegrated into the capitalist world. The controversial effects of capitalist development and the experience of consequent crises, including the present one, have led various groups to question the promises of the regime change, and to propose alternative projects for the future. We face ruptures in the liberal understanding of the region's desirable future (based on the promise of 'catching up' to the West), and subsequent waves of political activity from the part of various political and social groups. To make sense of the new turmoil from a historically grounded perspective, during this conference we propose to discuss the regime change and its consequences in a long term, global perspective.

In our questioning, we propose to *look at the development of modern Eastern European history as tied to the historical development of the modern capitalist world economy.* Local, semi-peripheral phases of state formation, modernization, embourgeoisment, proletarization, the construction and destruction of infrastructures of accumulation have been tied to the cyclical development of the capitalist world economy, in a relation of dependence and unequal development with the cores and peripheries of that economy. In that perspective, the question is raised in the following form: what was state socialism, the regime change, and the following forms of capitalist development within the historical evolution of global capitalism? What are the macro, meso and micro level processes through which we can trace the ways in which this region integrated into and interacted with global systematic processes?

To make sense of local systemic changes, such as the regime change and consequent forms of marketization, or the social changes and ideological formations they engendered, we start from the long-term systematic processes that shape these formations, and not from localized forms of their ideological interpretations. In this way, the question of the regime change will not revolve around whether the transition from 'socialism' to 'capitalism' was good or bad, but how the local forms of state socialism, the process of the regime change and the subsequent forms of marketization evolved in interaction with global systematic processes.

Some foci of interest in that perspective would be:

- How did specific *modes of world economic integration* in East European countries evolve within, and respond to changes within the postwar cycle of global accumulation and its crises? (E.g. the "long downturn" of US hegemony, the reorganization of global division of labor since the 70's, EU integration, changes in the direction of global financial flows and resulting crises)? What are the structural reasons behind different modes of integration?
- How do *internal aspects of institutional and infrastructural changes*, policies and cultural/symbolic production relate to reorganizations of models of world economic integration?
- If we think of *class* in terms of position within an integrated global capitalist process, how do we describe class formation in Eastern European countries in this period e. g. changes within elite fractions and coalitions, or the immense social change from agrarian to industrial labor, and later, unemployment?

How do we conceptually link*internal structural processes* of East European countries to global capitalist processes? How do we describe local structural constellations vaguely named as socialism, East European etatism, socialist embourgeoisement, urbanization/de-urbanization, structural dualism, etc. as elements of a global social formation?



### SATURDAY, 24 OCTOBER

#### 9.00 - 9.30: Introduction

Ágnes Gagyi and Csaba Jelinek (Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet)

### 9.30 – 10.45: Modes of world economic integration I. – Chair: Linda Szabó

Boris Kagarlitsky: Social contradictions of Russian politics

Annamária Artner: Premature socialism – Reasons and results of reintegration of Eastern Europe

in global capitalism

Stuart Shields: The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the

construction of neoliberal common sense in post-communist transition

Aleksandar Stojanovic: Class approach and the possibility of emancipatory politics: A case of

Yugoslavia

10.45 - 11.00: Coffee Break

### 11.00 – 12.40: Modes of world economic integration II. – Chair: Zsuzsi Pósfai

**Tamás Gerőcs:** Eastern European reindustrialization: The model of catching up or a new form of dependency?

**Ana Podvršič:** The making of the EU post-socialist periphery and strategies of capitalist accumulation in the post-Yugoslav Slovenia

Noah Brehmer and Agne Bagdziunaite: Policing capital accumulation: The case of Lithuania

Yuliya Yurchenko: Social forces in the making of contemporary Ukraine: Capitalist rivalries and

the dispossessed

12.40 - 13.40: Lunch

### 13.40 – 15.00: Institutional changes I. – Chair: Ágnes Gagyi

Andrea Jovanovic: Women without feminism, feminism without women

Márton Szarvas: Cultural Politics as Class Politics. Trajectories of the Cultural Institutional System

Through Socialist and Post-Socialist Semi-Peripheral Integration: The case of Hungary

Melinda Kovai: From the "New Man" to the "Personality": Child-psychology in Hungary between

1945 and the 1970s

15.00 - 15.30: Coffee Break

#### 15.30 – 17.30: Open event – Roundtable discussion

Mariya Ivancheva, Boris Kagarlitsky, Stuart Shields and Yuliya Yurchenko



### **SUNDAY, 25 OCTOBER**

### 9.00 - 10.15: Institutional changes II. - Chair: Mária Madár

Kacper Poblocki: The Polish model - a second hand periphery?

András Vigvári, Cecília Kovai, Tamás Gerőcs: What role for Eastern European rural areas in the

international division of labor?

Daniel Šarić: From Socialist utopia to laissez-faire paradise: Urban transformations and the

emergence of new social actors in Zagreb

10.15 - 10.30: Coffee break

### 10.30 - 11.45: Ideologies I. - Chair: Márton Szarvas

András Pinkasz: Dogmatists vs. reformers: Economic interests and ideologies during the

Hungarian New Economic Mechanism

Matthias István Köhler: Imperialism and irrationalism: On the emergence of reactionary cultural

criticism in Hungary after 1989

Stanimir Panayotov: The poverty of repetition

11.45 - 12.00: Coffee Break

### 12.00 – 13.30: Ideologies II. – Chair: Zoltán Ginelli

Mariya Ivancheva: Narratives of crisis in the European peripheries: The case of Bulgaria

Anna Ochkina: New democratic welfare state as the only alternative to neoliberalism

Ágnes Gagyi: External penetration as internal force in post-socialist Hungarian politics

13.30 - 15.00: Lunch

15.00 – 16.15: Round-up discussion – Chair: Márton Czirfusz

#### 16.30 – 17.30 Roundtable discussion with the journal Eszmélet

Tamás Krausz and Matthias István Köhler



### **FULL PROGRAMME**

### SATURDAY, 24 OCTOBER

9.00-9.30: Introduction

### Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet

Ágnes Gagyi

**Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet** 

Post-doc Researcher, New Europe College, Institute of Advanced Studies (Bucharest, Romania)

Csaba Jelinek

**Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet** 

PhD Candidate, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Central European University (Budapest, Hungary)

### 9.30–10.45: Modes of world economic integration I.

Chair: Linda Szabó

**Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet** 

PhD Candidate, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Central European University (Budapest, Hungary)

### Social contradictions of Russian politics

#### **Boris Kagarlitsky**

Director, Institute for Globalization Studies and Social Movements (IGSO) (Moscow, Russia)

General perception of political conflict in Russia, as presented in the West and in Russia's own liberal media is that an authoritarian regime is confronted by a democratic minority which is unfortunately not supported by the majority of people zombified by nationalist propaganda. However two points are clearly missing in this picture. First, the opposition leaders do not consider popular opinion as important, they blame the government for making concessions to the majority opinion and in many ways oppose the Kremlin from a position which has very little to do with democratic principles because the very idea of majority rule is rejected. Second, most people who support the Kremlin against the opposition do radically oppose almost every single decision or social measure adopted by the current government. At the same time most of the opposition intelligentsia and political figures usually support these measures, though often complaining that they are not radical enough. In other words, people who oppose the current state of things in the country, at least in social and economic terms, opt for stability. Those who are happy with the current social and economic setup in the country are the ones who are actively rocking the boat.

To understand the paradox we have to examine the nature of current political regime, its history and its contradictions. In fact, Russian political system is not an example of authoritarian rule, but rather represents elite consensus. This consensus principle on which decision-making is based explains why Russian economic system was so totally unable to use the opportunities that existed in 2000-2010 and why it has little chance to survive the current crisis. Liberal opposition is also part of the consensus but it is trying to shift the balance of power in its favour. At the same time the popular majority is not involved in the decision-process directly but within the current system their interests are considered (this can be compared to Anna Ochkina's notion of «passive democracy»). Changing balance of forces may easily turn against the majority that has no direct representation and depends on being taken into consideration by some segments of the elite, but not by elite as a whole. That is why popular understanding of political struggle can be formulated as a choice between a bad situation and something considerably worse. Passive rejection of opposition in this context is pretty reasonable and had little if anything to do with «zombification» through propaganda or «Russian soul».



Changes of 1989-2005 formed a particular political and social culture that is not reflecting Russian or even Soviet tradition but represents the consequence of mass experience acquired during that period. One also has to consider the effect of economic collapse in the 1990s and recovery in the 2000s.

However, as said before, elite consensus is unsustainable in the situation of crisis. Russian economic system is based on utilizing resources inherited from the Soviet times for the use in the new globalized market. Unfortunately not only these resources are exhausted, but the global market is changing and undergoing a structural crisis leading to the decomposition of the current neoliberal model. Thus also the model of passive integration into the periphery of capitalist World-system adopted by Russian elites in the post-Soviet period (and worked relatively well in the 2000s) is becoming dysfunctional.

Given the fact that popular majority (including not only wage-earners but also some sections of business) has no direct representation in the process, it is only going to lose out when the inevitable changes will start. But does this mean that the liberal elite will be able to manipulate the process according to their expectations? There are reasons to doubt this. The end of consensus also will be the end of passivity and will signal the beginning of a completely different politics, characterized by a radical confrontation between the democratic majority rejecting Western concepts of democracy and pro-Western elites that praise Western democratic ideology but reject its basic principle of majority rule.

# Premature socialism – Reasons and results of reintegration of Eastern Europe in global capitalism

#### **Annamária Artner**

Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Institute of World Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Budapest, Hungary)

Eastern Europe has been integrating into the capitalist world since it began to use capitalist incentives for economic development in the late 1960s. This process was reversible at the beginning. As, however, the capitalist solutions have spread in the Soviet Block, the U-turn back to the capitalism has been paved. The intensive and growing use of the capitalist incentives for production (like profit motive) was to substitute the socialist-type incentives (like efforts for and by the community of people) that have not had deep historical roots in the region. Socialist countries gradually slipped into a competition with the capitalist core on the territory of personal consumption and at the same time on the field of arms race. Either of these alone would have been detrimental for the socialist development but together they have totally eaten up both the material and ethical basis of a socialist future. Instead of an increase of productivity and hereby working towards the elimination of physical (blue collar) labour in order to end the division of labour into intellectual and physical work, what is the basis of all division of labour and class society, socialist countries' means of production were increasingly used for the socially ineffective defence industry while the civil production has been increasingly turned towards consumerism and the society towards individualism. As productivity of the "socialist" countries has lagged behind the capitalist core countries the race in consumption, or, to put it otherwise, the increase of the standard of living of population measured in the goods consumed, has been maintainable only by the indebtedness of their states. In the same time and for the same reason – i.e. the lagging behind productivity has not made possible the washing out of the physical jobs - the demarcation line between blue collar workers being governed and white collar workers who governed them has been widening. This triangle - the insufficient growth of productivity, the survival of physical-intellectual division of labour and the increasing use of capitalist incentives in production - was the most important immanent reason of the failure of the historical experiment that aimed to build a social system better than capitalism. This is why the systemic change in Eastern Europe in 1989-90 happened smoothly, without serious resistance of the fragmented and divided working class of the region.

The formal integration into the global capitalism after 1989 consummated the above described voluntary and internal real integration into the capitalism. The mode and speed of this previous and partial but decisive real integration have determined the differences of forms of capitalism in post-socialist Eastern Europe. Among many other, perhaps the most determining factors in differences of forms of "Eastern capitalisms" are (1) the levels and qualities of the industrial production that have survived in the countries decades after the systemic change and collapse of socialist regional integration (COMECON) that had before ensured huge market for the industrial output of its member states and (2) the level of penetration of the foreign direct capital into the countries, i.e. FDI-stock relative to the GDP of the individual countries.

The bulk of the FDI-import happened until the Eastern enlargement of the EU thanks to the privatization courses of the CEE-countries in the 1990ies. The formal integration of the CEE region into the global capitalism happened in a time when neoliberalism (liberalisation, deregulation and privatization) has been triumphant in global scale. It is important to underline that it could not have happen otherwise: the collapse of the regime that had promised an alternative to capitalism made the fulfilment of capitalism inevitable.



The formal integration into the global capitalism has doomed Eastern European countries to become a part of the global accumulation of capital and play the role of periphery of European core economies. This position has resulted in almost continuous drain of the value added from Eastern Europe via, among others, profit repatriation. On average of the eleven Central and East European countries (CEE11) the ratio of the repatriated profit to their GDP increased from 1.1 per cent in 2002 to more than 3 per cent in 2008 and then, i.e. in the following crisis years, remained on this level (3.1-3.3 per cent). Between 2002 and 2013 the repatriated capital income from CEE11 equalled with 2.8 per cent of their combined GDP. The peripheral position of Central and Eastern Europe in the global hierarchical system of capital accumulation decreases its ability to accumulate capital itself in order to develop its own technology, increase the productivity of its own production forces and hereby ease its dependence on transnational capital.

# The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the construction of neoliberal common sense in post-communist transition

#### **Stuart Shields**

Senior Lecturer, International Political Economy, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester (UK)

This paper sets out to explore the role played by the EBRD as an "organic intellectual" in the Gramscian sense, providing intellectual ballast for the hegemony of neoliberal reformers in post-communist transition. It notes the explicit political orientation of the EBRD and its palpable political mandate to facilitate not only economic reform. The social function of the EBRD is to aid the passage of common sense into hegemony through their specialisation in the elaboration of ideas. In Eastern Central Europe this manifests as the dominant social forces mobilising and perpetuating neoliberal development "common sense" among aspirational members of the working class. They present the allure of becoming middle class, in return for supporting reforms, despite not being the principle beneficiaries of such reforms. The paper analyses the developing intellectual commitment of the EBRD to legitimising neoliberalism since the collapse of state socialism and the formal reintegration of Eastern Central Europe into the wider regional and global political economy. The paper does so by interrogating the role of the EBRD in the refinement of strategies to maintain the legitimising power of neoliberalism. The argument is laid out in three substantive steps. In the first section the paper explores how Gramsci's notion of the organic intellectual provides useful traction in explaining the activities of the EBRD. The second section periodises three waves of the EBRD's activities as organic intellectual of neoliberal "common sense" in post-communist transition. In the third and final section the paper turns to the latest articulation of neoliberal legitimacy by the EBRD acting in the aftermath of the "global financial crisis."

# Class approach and the possibility of emancipatory politics: A case of Yugoslavia Aleksandar Stojanovic

Collective Gerusija, Center for Social Analysis (Belgrade, Serbia)

Concept of class is related to three important points: one is the role of parts of society in relation to the reproduction of the dominant mode of production, the other is level and type of organization that exists in these different parts of society and the third is the conflicted interests of these parts of society and its effect on the future of these societies. In capitalist societies, the articulation of historically specific realities on all these three points leads us to interesting conclusions and insights, among which is also the question of development of emancipatory political force in these societies.

In this talk we will examine the epistemological results of utilizing the concept of the class with regards to Yugoslav socialism. Primarily, as the dominant position held that classes seized to exist with the emergence of socialist regime, the question is whether we can utilize this concept in analysing this society. Obviously with the specific nature of social property that dominated the economic relations, the usual concept of capitalist and proletarian classes as they can be found in capitalist societies is not applicable. Still as many researches show, we had grave differences with regards to access to power, wealth and so on and this presents an interesting challenge to class approach. This also opens up the question of relation of different institutions of property and class structure of societies. Secondly, this relates to the question of organizational specificities of different parts of Yugoslav society and their possibility to pursue their different interests. Thirdly the question arises on how is this class structure of Yugoslav society related to the fall of socialism and transition to capitalism.

The main thesis of the talk will be that the class approaches to Yugoslav socialism (in difference to these approaches to capitalist societies) excluded the possibility of emancipatory politics (that obviously got side-lined and lost the historical battle) and that this limited the epistemological potential of these approaches.



10.45-11.00: Coffee Break

### 11.00–12.40: Modes of world economic integration II.

Chair: Zsuzsi Pósfai

**Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet** 

Junior Research Fellow, Institute for Regional Studies, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian

Academy of Sciences (Békéscsaba, Hungary)

The City is for All! (Hungary)

# Eastern European reindustrialization: The model of catching up or a new form of dependency?

**Tamás Gerőcs** 

**Working Group for Public Sociology Helyzet** 

Junior Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Budapest, Hungary)

The purpose of this paper is to understand the changing form of dependencies in the context of semi-peripheral development in Eastern Europe. My research is part of a bigger project within the Budapest-based Working Group for Public Sociology Helyzet. In this group we apply world-systemic approach to analyse the evolution of semi-peripheral capitalist development in interaction with the evolution of the international division of labour from a longue durée perspective. Semi-peripheral position reflects on a structural asymmetry within the hierarchical structure of the international division of labour that is best characterized by the relative scarcity of capital and technology.

While concentrating on two forms of dependency: external finances and the newly emerging European division of labour, in this paper we analyse the specific form of recently emerging Eastern European capitalist development since the 1970s through the global economic crisis in 2008 until now. The 70s mark a decisive turnaround in the development of global capitalism, which did not leave the socialist states intact. International credit flows to socialist-economies resulted in heavy debt accumulation and contributed to the dismantling of the COMECON market, while from the end of the 80s, in parallel with the political transition, FDI inflow – mainly through privatization and later due to the liberalization of capital market – became the dominant form of external financing. The initial effect of joining the EU seems among other things also to be financial since mounting currency-transfers contributed to the sustainability of a disadvantageous economic position in the newly evolving European division of labour, i.e. in interaction to the forceful economic restructuring of the industrial core countries.

Does regional reindustrialization, the relocation of German manufacturing to Eastern Europe, leads to a model of catching up? Or do we find reoccurring/self-reinforcing cycles of asymmetric dependencies that have been characteristic of historical capitalism in this region? We argue that the latter is the source of the recent industrial development. To test our hypothesis we focus on the above-mentioned three forms of external finance. More concretely, we argue that EU membership is not the new form of development undermining convergence but the new mode of reintegration into the European division of labour.

# The making of the EU post-socialist periphery and strategies of capitalist accumulation in the post-Yugoslav Slovenia

#### Ana Podvršič

PhD Student, University of Ljubljana (Slovenia) and Paris13-Villetaneuse (France)

Continual economic growth, political stability and a neo-corporatist system are some of the most frequently mentioned factors when one discusses Slovenia's post-socialist transition. For a long time considered a success story, the most prosperous and stable of the European post-socialist countries and the first among the new EU member states (2004) to enter the European Monetary Union (2007), Slovenia got badly hit by post-2008 socio-economic crisis. For local right-wing discourses, a gradual transformation approach and its deceleration of the "structural" reforms as well as corrupted or greedy political and economic elites are supposedly the main reasons for the difficulties that the Slovene economy is facing. On the other side, the left is mostly focused on the "neoliberal" turn of Janša's government in mid-2000s contributing to the indebtedness of the Slovene economy among other things. At the same time, over the last few years, the EU has been progressively perceived as a foreign imperial force that, with the support of the so-called local bourgeoisie, strives to subordinate the Slovene economy and to dismantle its exceptional post-socialist model. However, since the end of 1980s, both groups of actors have pursued the same



class project of, first, the extension and then, the intensification of the capitalist social relations in the post-socialist social formations in the Central and Eastern Europe. This does not imply that political and economic elites represent a homogeneous group without internal conflicts concerning the organization, regulation and preservation of capitalist exploitation. In fact, as states mostly compete in geopolitical struggles with each other for various resources situated on world markets and their potential profits, they pursue different "spatialisation strategies" to structure, or at least to influence, the world economy and the international division of labour. Indeed, the restoration of capitalism in post-socialist region has been accompanied by the process of the re-hierarchisation of national economies in the post-'89 European geo-economic space that has been to a large extent shaped by the EU-driven internationalisation of local states. To discuss the capitalist character of the Slovene State and its role in the "making of the EU post-socialist periphery", I analyse the strategies of capitalist accumulation of the Slovene state over the last two decades. The conclusion provides insight into how the crisis further reveals the European peripheralisation of the capitalist economy of Slovenia.

### Policing Capital Accumulation: The case of Lithuania

#### **Noah Brehmer**

BA in Philosophy, New School for Social Research (New York City, USA)

#### Agne Bagdziunaite

Social and Political Critique MA Student, Magnus University (Kaunas, Lithuania)

In this presentation we will explain the development of three distinct forms of capital accumulation in Lithuania through an analysis of the three distinct forms of social regulation that secured them, by force. Our basic thesis is then the following:

- 1.) Under the soviet political economy there was a highly centralized police institution where power was delegated from a centre to a periphery. This regime of regulation corresponded to a state-capitalist mode of accumulation.
- 2.) Under the Post-soviet political-economy private security companies eclipse the state as the guarantors of capital accumulation. This regime of regulation corresponded to a Laissez faire mode of accumulation; the privatization of public infrastructure aligns with the privatization of security.
- 3.) Under the EU political economy (post-Rubel crisis, 1998) the mode of regulation is re-institutionalized under the protocols of EU regulations which correspond with its market supremacy. The former Soviet police institution is literally copied and pasted into the present while the private security companies are given Para-institutional status. This regime of regulation corresponds with the rise of neo-liberal authoritarianism; a mode of capital accumulation characterized by the dual movement of the withdrawal of social infrastructure and the expansion of military and policing budgets.

The point of using the police as a standpoint for the analysis of the development and reproduction of these capital accumulation modes is that we show the indivisible relation between capital and the police. The political conclusion of our presentation being that the battle against the police is at the centre of our more general battle against capital.

# Social forces in the making of contemporary Ukraine: Capitalist rivalries and the dispossessed

#### Yuliya Yurchenko

Lecturer, International Business and Economics Department, University of Greenwich (London, UK)

The paper shows how accumulation rivalries of originally domestic and foreign transnationalising capital fractions eventually led to protests and armed clashes of 2013-14 across Ukraine. It looks into specificities of post-1991 politico-economic transformation of Ukraine while positioning it within wider neoliberal restructuring of global political economy. It shows how international financial institutions, IMF, WB, and EBRD with a blessing from the most influential EU and US lobbies - ERT, ICC, and ACC - designed Ukraine's "transition" space. That space was further customised by both foreign and domestic nascent capitalist forces that locked the country's economy in a struggle for accumulation of capital, legal and extra-legal. The on-going conflicts in Ukraine that may appear ideological, ethnic, or linguistic are often ideational/political, effective and manipulated rather than causal, and can be interpreted as structural ruptures necessitated by relocation of agency within and between social blocs, classes, and their fractions. The true conflicts are class formation and accumulation struggles. This paper documents the above ruptures in parallel with associated social movements to identify combinations of agencies behind the forms of Ukraine's politico-economic transformations. The expropriatory nature of oligarchs' accumulation struggle generated counter movements in dispossessed public which culminated into the relatively peaceful Orange Revolution in 2004



and protests in 2013-14 which by now became! a civil war. The new-old rulers who came to power after Yanukovych fled have not addressed systemic problems that led to the armed conflict, partly because many of them are the problem. Instead mythologised division lines are still drawn in Ukraine's society. I will show that (1) kleptocrats and oligarchs are yet to be challenged both on the level of cadre and ideology and (2) how increasingly militarised counter movements present both a challenge and a catalyst to stabilisation of social order and democratic rule in the country.

12.40 - 13.40: Lunch

13.40 – 15.00: Institutional changes I.

Chair: Ágnes Gagyi

**Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet** 

Post-doc Researcher, New Europe College, Institute of Advanced Studies (Bucharest, Romania)

#### Women without feminism, feminism without women

#### **Andrea Jovanovic**

Philosophy MA student, University of Belgrade (Serbia) Collective Gerusija, Belgrade and Novi Sad (Serbia)

Political life of Serbia in post-Yugoslav period has been marked by various processes of so-called transition from self-governing socialism to (neo)liberal capitalism. Among other things, transition was supposed to introduce feminism and questions of women issues into political space. During 90s, emerging women NGOs were primarily focused to anti-war propaganda and taking care of war victims but as the wars were coming to the end they gradually shifted to some broader liberal feminist engagements. After the Fifth October revolution and the fall of Milosevic government in 2000, feminist NGOs continued to work from this now officially accepted liberal position and as the years went by they have become more and more marginalized, dealing with issues like sex/gender violence, unequal salaries, political representation of women and so on in a very narrow and restricted space and extent.

Today, when you look up any relevant information or statistic, you can see that nothing important has been changed in regard to improvement of women position, and you could even argue that it became worse than before 1990. But what I believe to be more important than the question of whether or not "women transition" was successful is undertaking an analysis that will show that this feminist project has not only been doomed to fail, but that it has been wrong in its essence from the start. In an attempt to contribute to this analysis, I will try to illuminate some of the aspects of this process by focusing on two points. First one will be from the historical-economic point of view, where I will try to show how economic changes in post-socialist countries structurally imposed restrictions to radical change of women position and, more important, how paradoxically they contributed to re-traditionalisation of gender relations and abolishment of level of rights women had in socialism. This was of course strongly tied to the processes and directions that global capitalism was taking but it left specific consequences in postsocialist context. The second one will be what we can provisionally call ideological point of view, where I will be focusing on strongly anti-socialist propaganda of mainstream feminist NGOs and public denunciations of them as "imported from the west". Detached from our socialist history that was full of important feminist projects and with highly present pro-liberal and pro EU position, mainstream feminist NGOs, often full of strong auto-racist tension, contributed to an extremely bad picture and status of feminist projects among Serbian people, including unfortunately, women. Organizations for women liberation have never been more alienated and detached from real existing women. In order to build workable alternatives we must start with (re)inventing feminist positions that will respond to real women needs and to do so, we must examine this specific political and ideological space of our interventions.

Cultural politics as class politics. Trajectories of the cultural institutional system through Socialist and Post-Socialist semi-peripheral integration: The case of Hungary

#### **Márton Szarvas**

Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet Sociology and Social Anthropology MA Student, Central European University (Budapest, Hungary)



The purpose of this paper to analyse the aesthetic field in the state-socialist and capitalist environment between 1968 and 2014 in Hungary, as the social history of political and aesthetic self-reflection shaped by global forces. It analyses the institutional system of the New Economic Mechanism, its transition from 1984, the emerging liberal hegemony and the new hegemony of the conservative understanding of the role of culture, as they related to systemic changes within the world system and Eastern Europe's place within it.

After 1968 the Kádár Regime, as the part of the New Economic Mechanism, changed the perception of culture. A utilitarian system was elaborated in which the economically sustainable pieces of art supported the less profitable but ideologically beneficial pieces. After 1984 the slow privatization and marketization of cultural institutions started and the understanding of culture changed. It was not perceived as one main factor of the reproduction of social inequalities but as a consumable good. Since there was a lack of domestic capital which could be involved to the finance of cultural institutional system, endeavours happened just on the discursive level to make an independent cultural institutional system. From 2010 on, the new conservative government occupied all the chairs of the prominent institutions and put emphasis on the development of a new conservative taste system, while on the other hand it also promotes culture as part of the creative industry and with which comparative advantages can be gained.

I will argue that changes in macro economic processes highly influenced changes within the cultural institutions, and the understanding of the role of culture within the society. I am going to show through the case of Hungary how cultural politics are utilized as class politics and its impact on a semi-peripheral social self-reflection.

# From the "New Man" to the "Personality": Child-psychology in Hungary between 1945 and the 1970s

#### Melinda Kovai

**Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet** 

Senior Lecturer, Institute of Psychology, Károli Gáspár University (Budapest, Hungary)

During the 20th century the techniques for scientific study and professional influence of human behaviour, with the words of Nicolas Rose, the "psy-disciplines," played increasing role in the governmentality of the Western self. That is to say they connected those economic, political and moral strategies that could change the way the interpretations of phenomena from the inner world of the institutions to the techniques of shaping of the private selves. In spite of that the psychology integrated a universal international scientific discourse in the mid of the 20th century, the aim and the contents of the psy-disciplines in Eastern Europe were not the same as in the West, because the economic, political conditions of their operation were not the same as well.

The history of psy-sciences after 1945 in Hungary is inseparable from the cold war and the external political-economic integration of the country. The presentation follows the fate of the Hungarian child-psychology in the first three decades of the state-socialism. It illustrates how interweave the geopolitical situation of the country, the political decisions that use/neglect psychology, the contemporary interpretations of psychologist as professional or intellectual role, the strategies of producing psychological expertise and the characteristics of scientific-therapeutic communities.

15.00-15.30: Coffee Break

### 15.30-17.30: Open event - Roundtable discussion

#### Mariya Ivancheva

Post-doc Researcher, Social Justice, University College Dublin (Ireland) LeftEast

#### **Boris Kagarlitsky**

Director, Institute for Globalization Studies and Social Movements (IGSO) (Moscow, Russia)

#### **Stuart Shields**

Senior Lecturer, International Political Economy, School of Social Sciences, The University of Manchester (UK)

#### Yuliya Yurchenko

Lecturer, International Business and Economics Department, University of Greenwich (London, UK)



### **SUNDAY, 25 OCTOBER**

### 9.00 – 10.15: Institutional changes II.

Chair: Mária Madár

**Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet** 

Mérei Ferenc College for Advanced Studies (Budapest, Hungary)

History of Art MA student, Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös Lorand University (Budapest, Hungary)

#### The Polish model – a second hand periphery?

#### Kacper Pobłocki

Assistant Professor, Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology, Adam Mickiewicz University (Poznań, Poland)

With the rise of "planetary urbanization" and shifting of the epicentre of urban growth from the West to the Global South, there is an urgent need to "reassemble the urban," as Saskia Sassen put it. Most vocabulary in global "urban studies" was forged on the basis of the European and North American experience of urbanization. Under this paradigm, Eastern Europe was conceptualized as "under-urbanized," while the Global South was deemed "over-urbanized." This, however, assumes the West is the yardstick of "normal" urbanization. This talk will try to re-conceptualize Eastern Europe's place in the landscape of post-occidental urban studies by drawing a number of comparisons with cities from the Global South – an exercise that within the West-centred paradigm would seem impossible or even outlandish. Poland is no longer in a process of a "transition" from socialism to capitalism, or a "semi-periphery" of the West. Rather, with the centre of the global economy shifting South, Poland's fundamental place in the new world order has changed and represents a "second-hand periphery" to the South. The talk will describe the local consequences of this fundamental re-Orienting – In both socio-economic and intellectual senses but with a focus on the urban. I will demonstrate in detail how Polish re-Orientation was pivoted on two critical turning points – one in 1980 and the other 2004, making a case that 1989 was not a watershed as far as Poland's current integration to the world economy is concerned. I will describe how the Polish model of growth coalesced around those moments.

### What role for Eastern European rural areas in the international division of labor?

#### András Vigvári

Working Group for Public Sociology Helyzet Junior Research Fellow, Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Budapest, Hungary)

#### **Tamás Gerőcs**

Working Group for Public Sociology Helyzet Junior Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Budapest, Hungary)

### Cecilia Kovai

Working Group for Public Sociology Helyzet Junior Research Fellow, Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Budapest, Hungary)

Some of the most visible effects of capitalism's uneven development in Eastern Europe can be grasped in rural areas. In our study we focus on regional developments in Hungary in a longue durée perspective in order to better understand the link between long term global social processes and their historical workings in a smaller local context. For this we need to elaborate a comprehensive concept of rural development. Our hypothesis is that rural areas refer to a structural position in the capitalist development that can be best described as the hosting places of key commodity-resources – such as labour or materials – that are extracted by the agents of accumulation. Thus, rural areas are usually at the lower edge of the value extraction, the consequence of which is that they are provided little if anything from the locally extracted/produced wealth. In our approach we emphasize the significance of rural areas in the reproduction of the global division of labour in order to better understand their interaction with the centres of accumulation. Our hypothesis includes that rural development is not a separable sphere of social reproduction but contrary to that, rural development is one of the forms of peripheral underdevelopment in the broader evolution of historical capitalism.

In the case of Eastern Europe we see not only the repressive form of resource exploitation, but the mobilization of labour is



not always in the immediate interest of the agents of accumulation. During periods of crisis, these areas accommodate a large part of the unused worker's reserve army, and public policies are in many cases designed to discipline and control this reserve. By focusing on regional developments one can encounter structural patterns that – despite their changing historical forms – periodically reappear in the local social formation. In the case of Hungary, we see the historical formation of large-scale agricultural production since the 16<sup>th</sup> century the development of which paralleled with the emergence of the international division of labour. Large scale farming resulted in the high concentration of land ownership with a very few nobility possessing much of the productive means, while most of the population living under the condition of small-pot farming, or being landless. Our research aims to give some theoretical explanations for the historical rigidity of this structural development. We also plan to analyse those public policies that are meant to control and pacify the labour force in rural areas by workfare practices. We are also interested in the ideological framework of those policies that – in our observation – show an embeddedness in the structural development. One instrument in the ideological framing is the promise of self-supporting small-plot farming. These promises are fabricated to maximize the vote bank or pacify frustrated workers but the notion of agricultural self-reliance seems surprisingly unstable and in the long-term capitalist integration it comes under an enormous economic and social pressure.

# From Socialist utopia to laissez-faire paradise: Urban transformations and the emergence of new social actors in Zagreb

#### Daniel Šarić

MA in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Central European University (Budapest, Hungary)
MA in Political Science, University of Zagreb (Croatia)

This paper presents the processes of urban and social transformations of Zagreb during socialism, during the period of transition and the contemporary period. It builds upon my own research on urban transformations and social actors in Zagreb (Šarić, 2012), as well as that of other authors who have researched and written about these processes (Stanilov, 2007; Slavuj, Cvitanović, Prelogović 2009; Zlatar, 2014.; Svirčić Gotovac and Zlatar, 2015). The analysis emphasizes three key spaces in the city; the centre of the city, the site of the Central business district (CBD), and the site of the Zagreb Fair. These sites and the social actors producing and remaking them clarify much about the city and the transformations it underwent during socialism and post-socialism. Through them we can analyse the different constellations Zagreb was embedded in, during socialism in Yugoslavia, during the transition as the capital of Croatia, and now as it is allocated a peripheral role in the European Union. During socialism the city underwent its second modernization; it was highly influenced by urban planning as city governments, planners and architects implemented practices from both sides of the Cold War based upon Yugoslavia's unique position. This is especially important for Zagreb, which was during socialism connected to global economic flows; an example being Zagreb Fair located on its present site form 1956. After the collapse of socialism in Europe and during the transition the urban and social transformations in Zagreb were similar to developments in other post-socialist European cities. Still, some differences are highlighted, especially as these processes were made in the context of armed conflict. Zagreb gained more autonomy but still was a vital element in the 1990s state-building project. There was also a conscious abandonment of urban planning by the city government during the 1990s. This led to the emergence of the laissez-faire model in which the transformation of the city was given to market forces and the city became a playing field for new economic actors, some of them emerging through their role in the privatization of socially owned enterprises.

In the 2000s, with Croatia's pursuit of EU integration, the city saw more foreign direct investment accompanied by the rise of shopping malls and the formation of a central business district (CBD), as well as urban renewal in the city centre. During socialism the site of this CBD was where most of the socially owned enterprises used to be concentrated, which underwent privatization during the transition, and most were shut down. The sites have become a place for capturing new investment, either from local entrepreneurs or more powerful actors such as financial institutions and transnational corporations. In the 2000s the city government returned to some elements of urban planning and strategy, apparent in the adoption of urban master plans, and strategic plans, as well as implementing public-private partnerships project. The effort to include experts and representatives of civil society into the debate about urban transformation are noted. An important development is the emergence of actors such as Right to the City, and the citizens themselves, which politicized the transformation and contested it. There is valuable input to be gained from analysing the transformations of urban space and studying the emergence and organization of various actors and relationships between them and the city as an arena of struggle. The research can be a foundation for a broader and more comparative future research about the urban and social transformations, and social actors in the other post-socialist cities in Europe as well as their interdependencies in the global economy and global social formation.



10.15 - 10.30: Coffee break

10.30 - 11.45: Ideologies I.

Chair: Márton Szarvas

**Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet** 

Sociology and Social Anthropology MA Student, Central European University (Budapest, Hungary)

# Dogmatists vs. reformers: Economic interests and ideologies during the Hungarian New Economic Mechanism

#### András Pinkasz

Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet
PhD candidate, Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Budapest University of Technology and
Economics (Budapest, Hungary)

Discourse on market-oriented reforms dominated many COMECON countries in the sixties, but there were only few where reform processes became permanent. In Hungary, New Economic Mechanism was launched in 1968, but even now it is strongly debated how radically the original reforms were modified at the beginning of the seventies, and what was the main cause of the austerity pack in 1979. Contemporary Hungarian historiographies usually emphasize the role of ideologically organized group, named dogmatists, who distorted the economic reforms, and whose incompetence finally led to crisis. Instead of this narrative, I point out the role of interests and ideology not just in the case of dogmatists, but also in the case of reformers. I argue that the modification of the New Economic Mechanism was not so radical, as it was communicated, even if the main reformers were dismissed. Finally, I stress the importance of the influence of global economic processes on Hungarian political and economic debates.

The connection between the indebtedness and the dependence on foreign technology led many Hungarian economic policy makers to abandon import substitution industrialization. They were named "reformers" and wanted to promote efficiency in production through liberalizing the economy and urging competition between companies. Although some of their claims were fulfilled in the New Economic Mechanism, not just "reformers" participated and supported the economic reforms.

The economic reforms were partially successful, but it led to many conflicts: the living conditions of the working class deteriorated: their income in comparison to peasants and company leaders sharply decreased, meanwhile inflation started to rise. The new conditions of production were unsuitable for companies, which did not produce for Western markets, but produced for COMECON and inner markets. The intellectuals were divided. Those who worked in scientific and cultural areas gained more freedom, and they retained their relative high salaries. Not as in bureaucracy, where a strong austerity was introduced. Those, who suffered from the negative effects of the reform, and therefore opposed it, were named as dogmatists. The alliance of dogmatists was spontaneous and temporary, with only weak ties to each other. They easily articulated their discontents in the language of Marxism-Leninism. On the contrary, reformers referred to efficiency, and other anti-populist technocratic phrases. So finally the interest conflicts ended up being managed as ideological conflicts.

Meanwhile, the global economic changes rearranged the Hungarian economic and social relations in the seventies at two different occasions. The emerging global economic crisis at the turn of the sixties and the seventies were the one that swept away reformers and their allies after 1972. At that time, due to rapidly deteriorating terms of trade, the external debt increased steeply. The cheap petrodollar seemed to be the result to the crisis, as a source of technological change. However, the significantly increased international interest rates at the second half of the seventies strongly reconfirmed market-oriented reformers, who were the main supporters of restructuring the economy in order to integrate it stronger to the global capitalism through export-led industries.

# Imperialism and irrationalism. On the emergence of reactionary cultural criticism in Hungary after 1989

Matthias István Köhler

Goethe University Frankfurt/Main (Germany) Member of the editorial board of the journal Eszmélet (Budapest, Hungary)



It was noticed by many commentators, that the rise of nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism and the call for authoritarian solutions to the on-going crisis in Europe and especially in its Eastern parts shows some parallels to the thirties of the last century. In the Hungarian context, some people talk about "Neo-Horthyism" for example.

Today it is almost forgotten, but one of the most powerful attempts to put this time in a theoretical context was the concept of imperialism. Hannah Arendt for example, who can hardly be blamed for too much sympathy for Marxism, used the concept extensively in her genealogy of totalitarianism.

In my paper I would like to present an interpretation of the parallels between the interwar era and todays Hungary, which is trying to reconsider some of Georg Lukács' theoretical ideas expressed in "The Destruction of Reason." In a first step I want to expose the "dialectics of progress from liberalism to imperialism" (Stapelfeldt). In a next step, focusing on reactionary cultural criticism, I want to show, how Lukács interprets his contemporaries using the concept of irrationalism. Following Georg Lukács, I define irrationalism not as the opposite of rationalism but rather as a pathological form of it. Finally I want to ask, if and how we can apply this to a better understanding of the emergence of reactionary cultural criticism.

### The poverty of repetition

### **Stanimir Panayotov**

PhD Candidate, Comparative Gender Studies, Central European University (Budapest, Hungary)

In this presentation, I will deploy a working argument about the a/temporal concurrency (and not "inherent integration") of state socialism and global capitalism. However, I will NOT deal with 1) Castoriadis' now banalised mythology of "bureaucratic capitalism" in the socialist block, nor will I deal with specific case studies revealing how the transition to capitalism "happened" as a *datum*. Rather, I will deal with the *factum* of change *and its structure*, a change I do not call "transition."

In order to "make sense of local systemic changes," I will discuss the "factum of change" as a "structural factum" that is conceptually inherent in both idealized and burglarized notions of communism (e.g., Marx and Engels' communist catechism as opposed to Stalinism). This is especially visible in late socialist "shortage economies" and the question of consumption.

I will hypothesize that in criticizing liberal notions of "change" (given the teleology of explaining infrastructurally state socialist "integration" within a larger historical sequence) we still operate with a residual liberalist concept of "globalization." The very syntagmatic phrases "state socialism" and "global capitalism" already presuppose a certain conceptual destiny of both the state and the globe. Given this problem, we need a notion of change that re-defines globalization in macro-structural terms. Such notion also involves a critique of the notion of "semi-periphery," in as much as semi-peripheral analyses tacitly support the conceptual committal of capital to the globe ("the world").

I will try to analyse this through the notion of repetition in the work of Kojin Karatani (*The Structure of World History*) and Marina Gržinić and Šefik Tatlić (*Necropolitics, Racialization, and Global Capitalism*). Under Karatani, there is a repetition as re-presentation (the French Revolution), and a repetition as rupture (the assassination of Caesar). Under Gržinić and Tatlić, repetition is a debilitating tautology. Thus, what is debilitated is the cyclical process of transformation ("change") which leads to a "linear history" approach of capitalism, where linearity=necessity, and thus communism becomes part and parcel of precapitalist formation within given communist rule. The notion of repetition becomes as impoverished as that of change (as globalization). Thinking about the a/temporal concurrency of socialism and capitalism involves precisely a notion of repetition that presents the "factum of change," a factum that runs against the residual liberalist notion of "global capitalism" we still operate with as a datum.

11.45 - 12.00: Coffee Break

12.00 - 13.30: Ideologies II.

Chair: Zoltán Ginelli

**Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet** 

PhD student, Doctoral School of Earth Sciences, Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest, Hungary)



### Narratives of crisis in the European peripheries: The case of Bulgaria

### Mariya Ivancheva

Post-doc Researcher, Social Justice, University College Dublin (Ireland) LeftEast

Over the last few years of the Greek crisis, Greeks have started to complain, "we have turned into Bulgaria." For Greeks, Bulgaria is a country where people live under the poverty line and reconcile fully with their poverty without any resistance. Having lived through a transition from state socialism to liberal democracy and free market economy, since the late 1980s, and especially since 1989 Bulgaria has been affected by mass privatization, recession, unemployment, crumbling of welfare services, and ever larger numbers of outward migration. Greece has gone through similar experiences much more rapidly after the crisis in 2008. Yet, as Greek political scientist Dimitris Christopoulous has claimed, while the Greek people have articulated this process in terms of "crisis" and have shown massive resistance - expressed more recently by the electoral victory of Left-wing Syriza – in Bulgaria the narrative of "crisis" has mostly been absent. And even when Bulgaria has seen a wave of social protest, as other countries in the post-socialist periphery of Europe, the claims articulated were rather "civil" than "social," and rather in favour of the EU and further transnational actors which could bring "more of the same" through neoliberal restructuring in order to do away with "oriental" capitalism and finally join the "West." Yet, could the people in Bulgaria be seen as having normalized and internalized a condition of permanent crisis? How do we understand the lack of solidarity with what has been happening in Greece and other countries affected by the crisis in the Southern periphery of Europe? Discussing historical and current developments, and the way the transition and the crisis in 1996-1997 played into the Bulgarian understanding of a crisis and solution, I outline possible lessons that can be learned and ways to translate the political experience and mobilize across the two peripheries of Europe.

### New democratic welfare state as the only alternative to neoliberalism

#### **Anna Ochkina**

Head of Department, Scientific Methodology, Social Theories and Technologies, Penza State University (Penza, Russia)

Deputy Director, Institute for Globalization Studies and Social Movements (IGSO) (Moscow, Russia)

Neoliberalism was presented in Eastern Europe as a democratic alternative to the political system that existed before 1989. Though western liberal political institutions were put in place in almost every country of the region, this didn't make people feel really empowered. Neoliberalism was also presented as a model of efficiency and rationality. But economic achievements of the system are now put into question by global economic crisis, which reveals absurd inefficiency at the government and corporate level.

Under these circumstances the ultimate justification of neoliberal model is Stalinism. The irony of the situation is that neoliberalism is so discredited now that for many people even Stalinism is beginning to look more attractive. It's partly because neoliberal propaganda itself identified everything soviet with Stalinism. However, Soviet Union cannot be reduced to Stalinism. This necessarily creates a challenge for the Left, which should avoid both justification of Stalinism and acceptance of liberal interpretation of Stalinism as identical with socialism and Soviet reality.

The real question is not why the Stalinism as tyranny collapsed. The big question is why soviet Welfare State, created in 1960ies, was defeated so easily in the period of relative prosperity. It is clear that Soviet society overgrew its own model. But again the question is why people accepted neoliberal alternative instead of trying anything else. Soviet people took Welfare State for granted without even considering a possibility of public goods being a matter of struggle. At the same time they felt frustrated as consumers. Old capitalist proletariat with its traditions disappeared, but a new collective subject of emancipation failed to emerge. The only collective subject, which did emerge was new bureaucracy, which exploited the crisis of the system to transform itself to bourgeoisie.

The twentieth century has shown that effective anti-crisis measures were developed on anti-capitalist basis, the solutions were found outside the authentic capitalist strategies and motivations. Capitalism does not produce its own stabilizers, its own effective mechanisms of social and cultural reproduction, because the goal of free capital growth destroys all frameworks and restrictions. Today the Welfare state as a main stabilizer of capitalism is experiencing its own crisis. This crisis has a systemic nature, as it cannot be overcome in the prevailing socio-economic relations.



Current crisis of neoliberal model makes the question of Welfare State vitally important. The most important lesson of Soviet Welfare State was its complex and integrated character, each element contributed to general development: education, health care, culture, and so on. The important warning is that even the best Welfare State can't survive in un-free society. The Soviet Union could create the mechanisms to achieve general social goals. But it failed to create mechanisms to adequately formulate and evaluate such goals. The urgent question in contemporary world is, what social strata can become agents of social modernization.

### External penetration as internal force in post-socialist Hungarian politics

#### Ágnes Gagyi

**Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet** 

Post-doc Researcher, New Europe College, Institute of Advanced Studies (Bucharest, Romania)

Relying on world-systems and Latin American structuralist traditions, the paper proposes to grasp external dependence as internal force in the organization of Hungarian politics after 1989, as it plays out in the structural differentiation and alliance/conflict structures of social groups formed within the new phase of capitalist integration. In the analysis of political divisions, the paper focuses on elites' positions and vertical alliances within the post-socialist process of integration, and the way they mobilize global symbolic hierarchies in their ideologies of development projected from their systemic positions. It argues that global symbolic hierarchies actualized by elites struggling for mediating positions within integration could link into popular status struggles over capital's limited accommodation capacity, and everyday emotional struggles of identification in a dominated position. Through those linkages, frustration over global hierarchy worked to propel systemic integration into the same hierarchy.

13.30 - 15.00: Lunch

15.00 - 16.15: Round-up discussion

Chair: Márton Czirfusz

**Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet** 

Research Fellow, Institute for Regional Studies, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of

Sciences (Budapest, Hungary)

### 16.30 – 17.30 Roundtable discussion with the journal Eszmélet

#### Tamás Krausz

Professor, Department of Historical Russistics, Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest, Hungary) Editor of the journal Eszmélet

#### Matthias István Köhler

Goethe University Frankfurt/Main (Germany) Member of the editorial board of the journal Eszmélet (Budapest, Hungary)





### **Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet**

Gólya Cooperative Bar and Community House 1083 Budapest, Bókay János utca 34. https://helyzet.wordpress.com

https://www.facebook.com/Helyzet-Műhely

The Working Group for Public Sociology Helyzet was established in 2010 by PhD students and young post-doctoral researchers in order to analyse contemporary Hungarian society from a critical leftist perspective. Its members felt that questions of politics and the economy were treated almost separately in Hungarian discourses, while there was an increasing need to understand them as interconnected. Members of Helyzet formulated a critical stance towards social, political and economic analysis in contemporary Hungary, stating that it was limited by the master narrative of transition to an idealized Western European modernity, a narrative that transformed local complexities into exoticisms, and viewed local-global relationships through a primitive linear model of development. The working group



observes contemporary Hungary as part and parcel of contemporary European and global power relations. The aim of Helyzet is to connect existing knowledge on global and supranational relationships with local knowledge gathered from the broader sphere of sociology.

Helyzet covers a range of activities from the sphere of public sociology. Since 2011, public talks, debates and documentary film screenings were organized. These events provide tools of critical left analysis to students and activists, which are not available or not used in formal education. During the 2012-13 autumn and spring semesters, members of Helyzet offered three university level courses. In July 2013, the working group organized a summer camp, which was a follow-up to two courses offered in the spring semester (the Economic Anthropology of Post-Socialism, and the Hungarian Popular Movement).

Finally, Helyzet is connected with newer leftist mobilizations in several ways. Members of the working group find their mission also in providing gathered collective knowledge to political initiatives of similar approach. Helyzet members are typically activists who took part in founding various leftist groups and movement type organizations that gained verve in the last few years. Beyond informal knowledge transfer, from 2013 the working group began to provide targeted lecture-talks for members and groups of social movements.





### Gólya Cooperative Bar and Community House Gólya Szövetkezeti Presszó és Közösségi Ház

1083 Budapest, Bókay János u. 34. +36 (1) 785 5568 https://www.facebook.com/roncskocsma


The conference venue is the historical building of the "Gólya" (Stork) community centre and co-operative bar in the inner city area of Budapest.

### **Catering information**

Coffee and lunch on Saturday and Sunday will be provided for all guests free of charge. Lunch will consist of a two-course meal (vegetarian option included) and is to be served buffetstyle at our venue.



### Map of destination



### Introduction of Gólya

Gólya ("Stork" in Hungarian) is a co-operative bar and community house in the 8th district of Budapest, Hungary. It has a large inner space with a garden, a separate office space, a room for arts and crafts, and an attic that primarily serves as a movie theatre. It also has several basements that await potential public use in the future. The bar and kitchen provide a wide selection of drinks and meals, including daily lunch menus every weekday. There are live music events every week, with other programs such as film clubs, presentations, lectures, discussions, board game playing, art exhibitions, and regular



exchange markets for used products. Gólya hosts both public and closed events of groups or organizations, such as birthdays, proms, conferences, fundraisings, trainings, and meetings of all sorts, including political events.



Gólya serves as an authentic place for both international and local traditional music

### The place and the organization

The cooperative enterprise of Gólya has its roots in a previous project, a café situated in the inner city area of Budapest, Frisco Café. The cooperative of Frisco was founded in 2011. The group that ran the place decided to move to a larger site due to the increased size of the community and the need for an extended infrastructure. The new team assembled in 2013 and opened Gólya in the September of 2013.

The project started with eight people, forming a cooperative. With several people leaving and others joining, now (as of June, 2015) there are six co-op members and nine non-member workers in different positions by working hours, commitment and field of work. There is an organizational expansion coming next fall with several non-members becoming members.



City nightlife at Gólya

The Gólya project is strongly intertwined with a working group of young social scientists called "Helyzet Műhely" (Public Sociology Working Group Helyzet). They are regular users of the office space in Gólya, and organize public events, such as film clubs, lectures and discussions, to disseminate knowledge and critical perspectives on Eastern-European positions embedded in the global capitalist system. This group is the closest partner of Gólya, although a cooperation network has been formed by other groups and organizations, in which the co-op provides space, services and audience, while the other parties organize programs, usually on social and political issues important for Gólya. As the enterprise developed over time, it became able to provide full-time workers with a basic living, since previously it could only pay subminimum wages which required great self-determination and intensive volunteering.

#### History of the site and the neighbourhood

"Gólya" itself has a long and rich history. The place was built in the 1880's, and has always been called Gólya, and was originally intended to be a bar. It became an integral part of the 8th district, which served as the home of workers and artisans in the 20th century. After the system shift of 1989 and the following austerity and restructuring of the economy, most of the district's residents lost their jobs and livelihoods, and Gólya was also closed down. It hasn't been re-opened as a bar until 2013. In the 90's the 8th district became a stigmatized ghetto of a new underclass, formed by people who lived there before and migrants coming from rural Hungary or abroad. There is also a large proportion of gypsy residents, and sadly the stigma surrounding the district is ethnicised. The 8th became an isolated part of the city, structured by extended family relations, community networks and competing gangs or families. Social distress in the neighbourhood developed its own social rules in the context of extreme poverty, crime and drug use.

However, in the middle of the 2000's, a joint real estate development project of the district municipality and a private firm (public-private partnership) with a budget of hundreds of millions of euros started the redevelopment of the neighbourhood. It is called "Corvin Project." In the first phases of the project they had built an office building, a mall, a promenade and residential buildings with relatively expensive flats. This process involved the eviction of a number of residents and the demolishment of many old buildings, and initiated a process of gentrification. However, the 2008 crisis halted the project because of consequent financial problems. The area is increasingly gentrifying, which is only slowed by the specialities of Eastern European home property structure and other factors. In 2014, they started the construction of another office building, right next to the building of Gólya, which was - for the time being - taken off of the development plans. In the next phase, many more people face eviction and further existential instability, while new residents are moving in from other parts of town, coming from a higher, upper-class social strata.



Presentation on urban processes of social exclusion and gentrification in the 8th District by the Collective for Critical Urban Research at Gólya

### The social mission of the cooperative

The Gólya project is constantly analysing the local environment and the wider social structures they are integrated in, trying to understand its own position and role as clearly as possible, in order to plan its strategies reflexively. Based on this, the declared mission of the co-op is threefold. Above all, it concentrates on maintaining and developing a working co-operative model of organization and production that can assure members' control over the means of production, the well-being of members and their long-term safety. The Gólya team wishes to make their model transparent and open to the public, and they also wish to co-operate with similar projects in Hungary and internationally, to share their knowledge and maybe take the organization to a higher level. By understanding the possibilities and restraints of collective ownership and production under capitalist conditions, they wish to propagate working models of economic co-operation.



The Gólya team

The second goal is to maintain a space for partner groups, projects and organizations, which help achieving their own purposes. The Gólya team wishes to mediate between these different groups, to communicate their agendas, and to support the formation of a wider social movement. In order to help this happen, they hold regular "community meetings" for their audience and partner organizations.

The third goal is connected to the process of gentrification in the neighbourhood. The co-op realized that with their limited assets, they cannot bring significant change to what's happening (against the political power of the municipality and the economic power of the real estate development firm), and they also realize that as a newly opened bar with an audience of inner city youngsters, it is also part of the "pioneer wave" of gentrification. However, while perceiving these limits, they wish to cooperate with other organizations that work against gentrification and housing poverty, and to alter their negative effects. They also wish to communicate the actual structural mechanisms of gentrification to 8th district locals and others, in opposition to the rosy promises about progress and prosperity.





### **Rosa Luxemburg Foundation**

10243 Berlin, Franz-Mehring-Platz 1 +49-(0)30-44310221

The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation is one of the largest political education institutions in Germany today and sees itself as part of the intellectual current of democratic socialism. The foundation evolved from a small political group, "Social Analysis and Political Education Association," founded in 1990 in Berlin into a nationwide political education organisation, a discussion forum for critical thought and political alternatives as well a research facility for progressive social analysis.

Forming the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation are:

- The general and sustaining members of the association and the executive board members with Dagmar Enkelmann serving as chairwoman and Dr. Florian Weis as chief executive officer
- Academic scholars and scientists in advisory boards and as authors of our publications, scholarship recipients; liaison professors and hundreds of volunteers
- More than 100 employees that work in either the Academy of political Education, the Centre for International Communication and Collaboration, the "Studienwerk" (organisation providing social, financial and cultural support services to students in Germany), the Institute for Social Analysis, the Archive of Democratic Socialism or areas of public relations, bookkeeping or finances

In 1996 the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation was officially recognised as a nationwide affiliated trust of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), presently known as "DIE LINKE" (The Left). As such it works closely with DIE LINKE affiliated state foundations and associations nationwide.

#### Goals

The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation aims to:

- Organise political education and disseminate knowledge about social relations in a globalized, unjust and hostile world
- Provide a venue for critical analysis of current capitalism; act as a hub for programmatic discussions about a modern democratic socialism, act as a socialistic think-tank for political alternatives
- · Be a forum in Germany and internationally that supports dialogue between left-socialistic powers, socialistic movements and organisations, left-minded intellectuals and non-governmental organisations
- Grant funding to young scholars via undergraduate and postgraduate scholarships
- · Give impulses to self-defining socialistic political activities and support commitment to peace and international understanding for a socially just and solidary union

### Rosa Luxemburg



Born on March 5th, 1871, Rosa Luxemburg, a Polish Jew and participant in the Russian Revolution of 1905, was a co-founder of the Social Democratic Party in the joint Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania.

Next to Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg was the most important representative of the left-wing socialist, anti-militarist, and internationalist positions in the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of Germany before 1918. She was a passionate and convincing critic of capitalism as well as antidemocratic and dictatorial tendencies within the Bolsheviki. She confronted the compelling logic of economic laws and political strategies with the utopia of a new world. According to Luxemburg, this new world needed to be created in spite of widespread despair, deprivation of rights, cowardliness and the corruption of power.

Impressively, Rosa Luxemburg combined political commitment, scientific analysis, and the quest for empowerment as a woman. She saw herself as being in conflict, fighting both on a scientific and political level while her daily life presented the essential foundation. Throughout all her actions, she never shunned tenderness and sensibility.

# **UXEMBURG STIFTUNG**

